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INTRODUCTION 
I 
n the target article, I tried to make several points. The most important 
of these are: 1) adaptations sometimes can be illuminated by studies 
of current reproductive consequences; 2) studies of current reproduc- 
tive consequences (adaptiveness) can help us understand the extent to 
which psychological mechanisms are general purpose; 3) environmental nov- 
elty can foul-up the development of psychological mechanisms, just as it 
can foul-up adaptive outcomes; 4) it is inadequate to simply assert that a 
current psychological construct, even if universal (e.g., mate-choice pref- 
erence for average facial features, etc.), must have produced adaptive out- 
comes during the Pleistocene; 5) the methods extolled for evaluating current 
adaptiveness are not equally valid; and 6) the most evolutionarily relevant 
aspects of the Pleistocene were probably social, implying that (a) current 
environments may have changed much less than is widely assumed and (b) 
hunting and gathering per se is probably not a crucial aspect of our evolu- 
tionary background. 
Blurton Jones 
Nicholas Blurton Jones points out, and I agree, that there are a number of 
different ways to use evolutionary theory to gain an understanding of people 
and other organisms. Specializing in the use of one subapproach does not 
imply the belief that others are invalid. I also agree that so-called evolu- 
tionary psychologists have so far done little of what they repeatedly promise 
they can do, and that dual evolutionists have been big on modeling but have 
largely neglected to search for the empirical evidence necessary for dem- 
onstrating that their models have anything to do with actual behavior. 
There are three arguments I disagree with. First, I don’t think the “adap- 
tationists” have divided themselves into the “sociobiologists” and the “be- 
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havioral ecologists.” Some of the earliest explicitly human sociobiological 
research was cross cultural (e.g., Gaulin and Schlegel 1980; Flinn 1981; 
Betzig 1982; Hartung 1982). The point of this research was to understand 
particular dependent variables in terms of the independent variables that 
vary from culture to culture. Many such independent variables are ecolog- 
ical; for example, it appears that social stratification is influenced by social 
circumscription, and it also appears that social stratification is influenced 
by physical features that can circumscribe, such as mountain ranges (see 
Betzig 1982; 1986). 
I think the distinction to which Blurton Jones is alluding hinges on the 
extent to which different individuals have sought to measure ecological pa- 
rameters related to food quests, e.g., Hill and Hurtado have measured cal- 
ories, Betzig and Turke have not. This difference, however, stems not from 
differences in philosophy but differences in the specific questions being 
asked. In any case, what is important is that Blurton Jones and 1 agree that 
there should not be a distinction between studies of fitness consequences 
and studies of variation in response to ecological variables. 
Second, although some of us have been accused of being “phenotypi- 
tally agnostic,” I don’t think that the “psychologists” see themselves as 
differing from the “adaptionists” in a way that can be understood in terms 
of the proximate/ultimate distinction. Tooby and Cosmides, for example, 
construct their hypotheses out of their understanding of past selection pres- 
sures, and therefore their hypotheses are ultimate causation hypotheses 
every bit as much as those of Alexander, Blurton Jones, Chagnon, Hawkes, 
or Irons. In fact, Tooby and Cosmides would like to reserve the label, adap- 
tationist, for themselves (Tooby and Cosmides, this volume). The primary 
source of contention as 1 see it is that Cosmides et al. argue that information 
about adaptiveness means almost nothing, while also claiming that Alex- 
ander et al. think that information about adaptiveness means almost every- 
thing. In contrast, I argue that Alexander et al. believe that information about 
adaptiveness is properly one component of the adaptationist approach, be- 
cause such information often can contribute to our understanding of adap- 
tations and the phenomena of life shaped by adaptations. Thus, the “psy- 
chologists” might properly be accused of being poor adaptationists, but they 
cannot be accused of not being adaptationists. 
Third, the “dual evolutionary” approach, because it is a dual would seem 
to be inclusive of what Blurton Jones calls adaptationist and psychological 
approaches, and therefore would seem to include all the shortcomings of 
these approaches, plus the shortcomings unique to the cultural evolution 
component. Therefore, I don’t see how the dual evolutionists can be said 
to be on a firmer or more logical theoretical foundation (see Flinn and Alex- 
ander 1982; Daly 1982). 
Silk 
Given, as Joan Silk emphasizes, that adoption is complex and variable across 
cultures, it seems likely that all components of the evolutionary approach 
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will be required if we are to understand adoption. Thus, Silk, in doing more 
to increase our understanding of adoption than anyone else, has consid- 
ered-and stresses the need to continue to consider-a number of hy- 
potheses which view adoption as one or another type of reproductive strat- 
egy with psychological, political, economic, and demographic components. 
For example, one might hypothesize, for reasons that need not be de- 
veloped here, that adoption of nonrelatives in western societies might be 
adaptive because of social disadvantages associated with childlessness. Or 
one might hypothesize, alternatively, that such adoption is a maladaptive 
effect of maternal and paternal emotional mechanisms gone awry in novel 
environments. The point is that a first step in distinguishing these hypotheses 
might appropriately involve trying to discover the impact adoption has on 
the components of inclusive fitness. 
In general, understanding why potentially informs the study of “how” 
(Tinbergen 1963), and tests of adaptiveness can distinguish hypotheses pos- 
iting “why” (see, e.g., Grafen 1988: 458). Said another way, an understand- 
ing of evolutionary (i.e., past) reproductive significance often must preceed 
attempts to understand mechanisms, and a first step in understanding ev- 
olutionary reproductive significance often must involve understanding cur- 
rent reproductive outcomes (i.e., current adaptiveness). Thus, it probably 
is not accidental that none of the individuals arguing vehemently against one 
or another component of the evolutionary approach-and hence against, a 
priori, one or another class of hypothesis-have contributed significantly to 
our understanding of complex phenomena, such as adoption, depotism, poly- 
andry, morality, etc. 
Irons 
William Irons’ commentary directly addresses each of the six points listed 
in the Introduction, and generally agrees with them. Beyond noting here 
that his commentary contributes many additional, important insights, I will 
direct the remainder of this reply to the three commentaries by Jerome Bar- 
kow, Leda Cosmides, Donald Symons, and John Tooby (BCST). BCST 
mostly focus on what they believe is an inordinate interest in current adap- 
tiveness, which, accordingly will be the focus of my response. 
BCST Acknowledge the Importance of Measuring 
Current Fitness 
First, it is important to recognize that, disguised with much irrelevancy, 
redundancy, and innuendo, BCST end up agreeing that assessments of cur- 
rent fitness can illuminate adaptations (e.g., Symons, this volume, p. 430; 
Tooby and Cosmides, this volume, pp. 391 and 398-399). Symons should 
also recognize that Alan Grafan and Randy Thornhill, whom he cites re- 
peatedly, also defend the view that measurements of current fitness, es- 
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pecially the components of fitness, can illuminate adaptations (Grafen 1988; 
R. Thornhill, personal communication). Grafen, for example, states that “all 
methods of investigations have their drawbacks, and in analyzing LRS (life- 
time reproductive success) data I would certainly perform the LRS analyses 
first and unleash my suspicions on the results afterwards” (p. 458; see also 
p. 456). This admission, coupled with the patent falsity of the claim that I 
and many of my colleagues believe that measurements of fitness provide a 
complete description of an adaptation, indicates that there is no substantive 
basis for the dichotomy implied by Symon’s DA/DP schema. 
Furthermore, abstract, theoretical claims about the primacy of a par- 
ticular subapproach are generally invalid. The usefulness of a subapproach 
must be decided on the basis of the question of interest (Tinbergen 1963; 
Betzig 1989). For example, findings suggesting that the patterns and rules 
of adoption play themselves out adaptively throughout Oceania is an im- 
portant first step towards refuting the widely held belief that the cultural 
patterns and rules of adoption (or any other aspect of culture) arise and 
change by a process of independent cultural evolution (Durkheim, Marx, 
White, Sahlins, Cloak, Dawkins, et al.). The reason is that such results are 
not expected from independent cultural evolution, but are expected if par- 
ticular psychological mechanisms are functioning as they were designed to 
function by individual level selection (e.g., Turke and Betzig 1985:86; Turke, 
this volume). Obviously, however, tests that discover adaptive outcomes do 
not deny the importance of additional studies of mechanisms; rather, tests 
of adaptiveness facilitate the study of mechanisms. Thus, primacy is in the 
eye of the beholder. 
You Can’t Take the History Out of Natural History 
Tooby and Cosmides begin their commentary with quotations by Austin 
Hughes and Robin Dunbar. These are meant to demonstrate that many 
human sociobiologists fail to understand that adaptations are designed by a 
history of selection and, accordingly, believe that measuring current fitness 
consequences (i.e., current selection) is all there is to an evolutionary ap- 
proach. Hughes and Dunbar’s position is contrasted with that of George 
Williams, which then allows Tooby and Cosmides to conclude that “[Tlhere 
is a deep though largely unexplored schism in modern evolutionary thought 
. . “(p. 376). Incredibly, they then devote their paper to refuting the claim 
that current selection pressures have designed adaptations. Symons’ com- 
mentary also finds it necessary to point out that adaptations are designed 
by past selection, and he also brings the reader’s attention to Dunbar’s work. 
Barkow’s commentary strives, essentially, to make the same point by as- 
serting (incorrectly) that I maintain that assessing current adaptiveness “is 
the central question for human sociobiology” (cited from Barkow’s ab- 
stract). 
Although Hughes may have been taken out of context (I think he intended 
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to suggest only that it is inadequate to simply assert that a particular trait 
must have been adaptive during the Pleistocene), Dunbar appears to stand 
guilty as charged (although in view of his solid primatological contributions 
I think it likely that even he has somehow managed to argue himself into a 
corner in which he does not actually stand). Why, in any case, do BCST 
think that Alexander, Betzig, Chagnon, Dickemann, Hill, Irons, Kaplan, 
and Turke (to name some of those singled out in recent papers by BCST) 
support Dunbar’s erroneous opinion? Perhaps they believe that we are guilty 
by association, since the quoted statements by Dunbar appeared in Chapter 
9 of Human Reproductive Behaviour (1988), edited by Betzig, Borgerhoff 
Mulder, and Turke. But read on. 
First, it is relevant to note that Dunbar’s chapter was commissioned as 
a replacement for Symons’ chapter. Second, Betzig and Turke asked Dunbar 
to cut the statements in question, but were refused. Pressure from the pub- 
lisher led, unfortunately, to our capitulation. In short, we were forced to 
exchange one extreme view for another- current fitness consequences mean 
nothing, to current fitness consequences mean everything-and regret the 
whole affair. Third, it is especially relevant to note that Symons, through 
correspondence with Betzig, was aware of this whole chain of events. More- 
over, he has been aware for some time of published statements by Betzig 
criticizing Dunbar for taking “the history out of natural history” (Betzig 
1989). In fact, Symons cites Betzig on this point, but, oddly, he does so in 
the middle of an attempt to characterize her, and me, as supporters of Dun- 
bar’s perspective. How can he justify such behavior? 1 suppose that he would 
answer that we say one thing and do another. But read on. 
In fact, what Betzig and Turke (and others) have done is sometimes 
found it useful to test adaptationist hypotheses by measuring current repro- 
ductive outcomes. For example, my primary research interest has been in 
understanding fertility determinants -fertility transition in particular (e.g., 
Turke 1985; 1988; 1989; 1990). A central hypothesis which I developed in 
this research is that individuals are expected (in light of theories of life history 
evolution [e.g., Williams 19571) to have been psychologically designed (by 
a history of selection, which in terms of current development involves learn- 
ing solutions to current problems) to invest in their offspring, grandchildren, 
and other younger relatives throughout life. Thus, at least in existing tra- 
ditional environments -environments in which social organization contin- 
ues to be based on kinship-I expected to find that the direction of net 
resource flows between individuals would be from the elderly to their 
younger relatives (more precisely, from individuals who are not directly able 
to convert resources into offspring to their close relative who are). This 
pattern of resource flow, I hypothesized, can contribute significantly to re- 
productive output. 
Through a variety of measures I found that resources are flowing in the 
expected direction on Ifaluk Atoll, Yap Island, and in the few other tradi- 
tional societies for which the appropriate quantitative information had been 
450 P. W. Turke 
gathered (e.g., Hadza, rural Trinidadians) (see especially Turke 1989). More- 
over, I found that resource flows are having the effect I expected: young 
adults with elderly parents available to provide resources and services are 
outreproducing their counterparts (e.g., Turke 1985; 1989). 
If additional tests on Ifaluk and other societies tend to further confirm 
the above hypothesis, we will have advanced our understanding in the fol- 
lowing ways. In terms of understanding fertility transition, it would seem 
likely that one of the mainstream explanations of high fertility is reversed: 
the conclusion that a projected need for old age security stimulates adults 
in traditional societies to have many children, becomes an offspring-based 
old age security institution can be expected in many traditional societies 
because it serves the reproductive interests of the elderly, but the repro- 
ductive interests of the elderly generally lie in the well-being of their younger 
relatives. So, in effect, old age security generally is for the well-being of the 
young. This is a very different interpretation from what passes as dogma in 
the demographic literature (e.g., Caldwell 1982; Handwerker 1986), and has 
profound policy implications. For one thing, it implies that simply supplying 
the elderly in traditional societies with government pensions will increase 
fertility and completed family size (if all else remains the same), which is 
exactly the opposite of what generally is intended. (For the latest details 
and additional implications for demographic arguments, see Turke 1990.) 
In terms of understanding human evolution (including evolution of psy- 
chological adaptations), the above hypothesis and tests yield a number of 
implications. I will discuss two of these. 1) Support is given to my assump- 
tions about which features of the environments of human evolutionary his- 
tory have been important in the evolution of traits governing demographic 
outcomes; these include facts and ideas about the nature of kin networks, 
the vulnerabilities to which children have been subjected, and the particular 
services and resources which have been reproductively limiting (see espe- 
cially Turke 1989). That is, my hypothesis and others like it (Turke, this 
volume) provide a window into the past. 
To Tooby and Cosmides (this volume), my having pointed out in the 
target article that understanding past selection pressures is difficult suggests 
that I therefore believe that we should give up on trying to do so. In fact, 
the more impartial reader will find that I argued exactly the opposite. Be- 
cause it is difficult but nevertheless important to reconstruct the past, 1 
argued that we should use every opportunity to do so, including conducting 
tests of those adaptationist hypotheses which predict currently adaptive out- 
comes. BCST, in contrast, argue that X was adaptive in the Pleistocene 
because Y and Z were selective pressures in the Pleistocene, but they forego 
one opportunity to evaluate the validity of Y and Z by foregoing the op- 
portunity to determine whether X is currently adaptive, and if not, deter- 
mining why. Thus, one reason 1 characterized BCST as accepting a simple, 
static picture of the Pleistocene is that anyone who thinks she or he knows 
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so much about the Pleistocene that tests of the foregoing type are unnec- 
essary, must also have a relatively simple, static model in mind. 
2) My hypotheses on fertility transition have been explicit on the mech- 
anisms involved, to the extent that I believe current knowledge makes this 
possible. (One should not confuse this kind of restraint for phenotypic ag- 
nosticism, nor should one confuse a lack of appropriate restraint with psy- 
chological sophistication.) By testing such hypotheses one tests (among 
other things) statements made about mechanisms, which should, as BCST 
repeatedly point out, allow further sharpening of the hypotheses. I believe 
that this cycle of progression is precisely what has emerged from my work 
on fertility transition (see Turke 1985; 1988; 1989; 1990; this volume). 
I emphasize that had I failed to find that elderly parents confer a re- 
productive advantage on their adult offspring, my explanation for high fer- 
tility in traditional societies would have been severely challenged. Moreover, 
the proximate psychological components of my hypothesis would have been 
challenged at least to the point of raising questions about why current en- 
vironments interfere with the development of mechanisms which obligate 
parents to their offspring for life, or why this sense of obligation, if it has 
developed, fails to produce the intended reproductive consequences. (To 
Barkow, I note that if all of the above is not indicative of a vertically in- 
tegrated approach, I don’t know what is.) 
In using the above example to illustrate my perplexity at having been 
labeled a phenotypically agnostic adaptivist, I also could have used any 
number of examples from the work of colleagues like Alexander and Betzig 
(see the target article). (Note, though, that papers that are largely pheno- 
typically agnostic may nevertheless be extremely insightful, and therefore 
should not be condemned on first principles [e.g., Trivers and Willard 19731.) 
Thus, it seems to me that the approach of Alexander et al. differs little from 
that of many who have escaped the criticisms of BCST. 
Consider the work of Martin Daly and Margo Wilson (1988) on homicide. 
The important difference between my work on fertility transition and theirs 
on homicide lies not in me not doing what they have done but rather in their 
not doing one of the things that I have done. Whereas I have explored the 
current reproductive consequences of predicted patterns of resource flows, 
they have not explored the current reproductive consequences of homicide. 
This is not a criticism of Daly and Wilson (it is legitimate to pass over 
particular avenues of the evolutionary approach as long as the avenues being 
pursued continue to bear fruit); nor does it imply that they have made less 
progress on their chosen topic than I have on mine. Still, an explicit 
description of the selective pressures under which homicide would have 
been adaptive in the past can generate predictions about the present 
circumstances, if any, under which homicide should be adaptive. Support 
for such predictions would help to substantiate the arguments about relevant 
selection pressures and mechanisms. Disconfirmation would question these 
same arguments, or require an explanation as to how current circumstances 
452 P. W. Turke 
interfere with the function of the mechanisms that were designed by the 
selective pressures designated in the hypothesis. In either case, one would 
be in an improved position for the further study of mechanisms. 
Another similarity between my work and that of Daly and Wilson is 
that we are each trying to understand human nature in order to understand 
a specific phenomenon which is of interest in its own right. In this respect, 
I believe that the only person involved in this debate who is doing something 
somewhat different from the rest of us is Leda Cosmides: answers to the 
Wason selection task are not intrinsically interesting (e.g., Cosmides 1985). 
Although I support her efforts, and recognize that her findings may be ap- 
plied to intrinsically interesting phenomena, I nevertheless believe-as she 
probably does-that an understanding of fertility determinants, homicide, 
etc., would come more slowly if we all limited outselves to her experimental 
methods. 
To summarize this point, there is no validity to the claim that I or the 
colleagues 1 have mentioned fail to recognize that adaptations are products 
of past selection pressures. The “deep schism” that Tooby and Cosmides 
believe they have identified actually separates the vast majority from almost 
no one. Furthermore, there is no validity to the claim that I or my colleagues 
believe that understanding current adaptiveness is all there is to understand- 
ing adaptations. 
General Purpose Mechanisms 
I suspect that mistaken assumptions about the evolution of general purpose 
learning mechanisms (see the target article) are behind Tooby and Cosmides’ 
misguided claim that Alexander et al. do not understanding that adaptations 
have been designed by past selection. To illustrate, consider a recent article 
by Robert Smuts (1989) which was cited by Tooby and Cosmides (this vol- 
ume) as an example of the widespread belief that adaptations are products 
of current selection pressures. In commenting on Buss (1989), Smuts argues 
cogently that some of Buss’s predictions about human mate choice should 
be altered to more explicitly recognize that mate choice is a complex phe- 
nomenon that has, throughout human evolutionary history, functioned to 
solve an array of often novel economic, social, sexual, and reproductive 
problems. Once one recognizes this history of dealing with novelty, it be- 
comes plausible to suggest, as Smuts does, that current patterns of mate 
choice are somewhat novel adaptive solutions to the somewhat novel social, 
economic, sexual, and reproductive problems posed by current environ- 
ments. 
Smuts obviously is not ignoring past selection pressures. However, 
Tooby and Cosmides, like Symons (1989) in his misunderstanding of Crook 
and Crook on polyandry (see Alexander and Turke, this volume; Betzig 
1989), fail to recognize this because they deny (or at least restrict too se- 
verely) the evolution of general-purpose learning mechanisms (note: the term 
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general-purpose, as I use it, does not imply infinite flexibility .or adaptive 
response in all situations). This overly narrow view of human flexibility leads 
Tooby and Cosmides, I think, to the conclusion that Smuts is proceeding 
from the assumption that human mate choice mechanisms have been de- 
signed by current selection pressures. It is to this same deficit which Alex- 
ander (this volume) is referring when he writes, “[Symons] must believe 
either that the ability to learn is not an adaptation or that learning ability 
did not evolve because it could be (was being) applied to multiple or gen- 
eralized life situations” and “To deny that learning has evolved to deal with 
novelty seems to me to deny the possibility of the most distinctive psychical 
attributes of humans having evolved . . .“. 
In short, by assuming an overly narrow facultative ability for humans, 
BCST mistake hypotheses predicting facultative adjustment to a wide range 
of current problems for the absurd idea that such hypotheses posit that the 
relevant adaptations themselves are somehow designed by these current 
problems (i.e., ironically, they confuse outcomes with mechanisms). It is 
reasonable to entertain hypotheses which predict considerable adaptive flex- 
ibility because theory and evidence indicate that the environments of human 
evolutionary history posed a range of novel social problems inclusive of 
many current problems (e.g., Alexander 1989; Turke 1989; this volume). 
Note, though, that the term “novel” as Alexander and I use it does not 
mean completely unprecedented as Tooby and Cosmides (this volume, p. 
44) try to imply. Although Tooby and Cosmides are correct in pointing out 
that humans cannot be expected to adapt to completely unprecedented phe- 
nomena, nothing that I or my close associates have written contradicts this 
obvious fact. For example, Alexander (this volume), Betzig (1989), and Turke 
(this volume) all go in to some detail describing why the problems that Ti- 
betan polyandry solves are likely to be closely related to the problems faced 
by our distant ancestors. I made a similar point in my discussion of the 
avoidance of fast moving trucks (Turke, this volume). 
Perhaps another example is necessary. The ordinary integer 
31486779015 has a precedent, which undoubtedly dates to the Pleistocene, 
in the ordinary integer 2. Similarly, doubling 31486779015 and subtracting 
it from itself almost certainly has a precedent in these functions having been 
carried out during the Pleistocene with the number 2 (e.g., during food shar- 
ing). Thus, in all of these respects 31486779015 is not novel. However, odds 
are that no one has ever written out the number 31486779015, doubled it, 
and subtracted it from itself, and therefore in some sense doing so is novel. 
The alternative to the belief that arithmetic cognition mechanisms have been 
designed to solve “novel” problems is the belief that individuals have a 
distinct mechanism for solving each specific arithmetic problem that oc- 
curred in sufficient frequency, and with sufficient importance to fitness, in 
the Pleistocene. However, this alternative is simply too domain specific to 
be theoretically plausible, and the fact that humans are able to do arithmetic 
correctly on numbers that would not have been relevant in the Pleistocene 
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provides empirical refutation. Thus, arithmetic cognitive ability must be rep- 
resentative of a general purpose mechanism that, by design, has infinite 
range on some dimensions. 
Although Tooby and Cosmides appear to be trying to draw a distinction 
between their own position on novelty and that of Alexander and Turke, 
they are, in effect, acknowledging the existence of general purpose mech- 
anisms for dealing with novelty when they write “ability to handle a certain 
kind of variation depends upon selectively significant encounters with cues 
probabilistically linked to that type of variation in the evolutionary past” 
(this volume, p. 407). Unfortunately, this style of argumentation (distort a 
position, correct the distortion) appears throughout Tooby and Cosmides’ 
commentary. 
Adaptiveness 
Following Barkow (1989) and Symons (1987), Tooby and Cosmides (this 
volume, p. 401) present a list of human activities which are supposed to 
represent definitive examples of maladaptive behavior; they list buying por- 
nography, listening to music, donating blood, and more (see also Tooby and 
Cosmides 1989). One cannot draw firm conclusions so easily. To imagine 
and then assert that people who buy pornography, listen to music, and donate 
blood would increase their inclusive fitness by not doing these things is 
invalid because imaginary strategies are not constrained like the strategies 
of real people (Turke, this volume). Rules, norms, customs, and limits on 
available information are only a few of the subtle and not so subtle factors 
which constrain actual behavior. 
Returning to an earlier example (Turke, this volume), Cosmides and 
Tooby may be able to imagine salmon foregoing the immense struggle to 
return to their place of birth to spawn, but I don’t think they would count 
on the fact that salmon do engage in this struggle as evidence of maladap- 
tiveness. Rather, like most of us, they would leave this issue open for the 
time being, because there is a reasonable chance that a better understanding 
of the constraints will eventually reveal the adaptiveness of this behavior 
(see Quinn and Dittman 1990). They should be just as careful when it comes 
to people. 
In addition, and probably more important, Cosmides and Tooby seem 
to think that I (and colleagues) have a stake in proving that people behave 
adaptively. Perhaps they think that I think evolutionary theory, or at least 
the adaptationist approach, will be invalidated by finding maladaptiveness. 
Wrong-we are all aware that past selection pressures mold designs that 
can yield maladaptive outcomes in current environments, and that under- 
standing past selection therefore is likely to be the key to understanding such 
outcomes (Alexander, this volume). Nevertheless, although I am certain that 
some current human behaviors will prove to be maladaptive, I am not certain 
about any of Tooby and Cosmides’ specific examples. 
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Consider pornography. Tooby and Cosmides’ claim that the preoccu- 
pation of some males with pornography is primae-facia evidence of mala- 
daptiveness. Apparently they believe this because, as they state, pornog- 
raphy involves the stimulation of a Pleistocene mechanism by non- 
Pleistocene objects; “artificially created images of females.” (Note: Pleis- 
tocene males probably imagined female images, and they certainly drew and 
sculpted them, so artificial images are not as novel as implied.) Thus, in 
their view, exploring the current reproductive consequences of pornography 
wastes time that should be devoted to thinking of hypotheses, like pornog- 
raphy might “reflect some underlying adaptation, such as the obviously 
oversimple decision rule: move towards situations that produce retinal im- 
ages of naked nubile females and become sexually aroused” (p. 402). 
However, to me, what is most obvious about their decision rule is not 
that it is oversimple (which it is) but that it does not even begin to tell so- 
called Darwinian anthropologists anything that we did not already know. Of 
course, males have been designed to have an interest in nubile females, and 
of course pictures of such are likely to sometimes stimulate and attract. 
While Darwin and Trivers deserve much credit for providing the insight 
which makes this now obvious inference possible, the inference itself does 
not count for much. Unfortunately, although there are exceptions, this has 
been the standard so far in the work of many who call themselves Darwinian 
psychologists. 
BCST would probably agree that a useful psychological theory of por- 
nography would attempt to explain the ultimate and proximate features of 
the phenomenon in terms of life history (e.g., why interest peaks at particular 
ages); it would explain variation in the popularity and respectability of cer- 
tain categories of pornography across social and economic categories; and 
it would explain social intracacies like why an interest in pornography is 
hidden or denied in some contexts (e.g., in the presence of females, in the 
presence of higher status males) and openly and used for status advancement 
in other contexts (e.g., among one’s pool-room buddies). The problem, of 
course, is that such a theory would be complex; it would require the de- 
scription of a large number of rules (adaptations) like “move towards sit- 
uations that produce retinal images of naked nubile females,” “engage in 
activities which trigger cues to status, ” “note that status cues are context 
dependent,” and “reflect on past experiences to make probabilistic predic- 
tions about context dependency,” as well as many additional rules that co- 
ordinate this very incomplete list of relevant adaptations. 
I know of no better way of building such a theory than by trying to 
identify and coordinate these rules as components constituting a complex, 
highly plastic, reproductive strategy. Thus, if anyone can come up with a 
plausible theory of the reproductive significance of pornography, I want to 
know about it-whether or not it predicts currently adaptive outcomes. 
This tendency to produce overly simple mechanistic explanations for 
complex phenomena results mostly from the tendency to focus on one or 
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two specific algorithms that limit plasticity to one or two choices. An al- 
ternative view of human nature is not that specific algorithms are absent 
but that they are complexly interrelated in a way that yields phenotypes that 
are much more plastic-much more capable of a general purposeness-than 
BCST imply. This point is extremely important to the current debate about 
the relevance of current reproductive outcomes because relatively inflexible 
organisms are expected to fare poorly in even slightly novel environments; 
relatively flexible organisms are not. Thus, tests of current adaptiveness 
delimit the boundaries of human flexibility, and in so doing begin to identify 
and describe psychological mechanisms. I am astounded to find that Tooby 
and Cosmides would regard such insights as trivial (see p. 399): whereas 
in fact, to ,deny the importance of such tests is to “deny the possibility of 
the most distinctive psychical attributes of humans having evolved . . .” 
(Alexander, this volume, p. 32). 
Aggregated and D&aggregated Components of Fitness 
As Tooby and Cosmides point out (this volume, pp. 399-400), lifetime fitness 
results from hundreds or thousands of adaptations, making it problematic 
to claim an association between fitness and a specific adaptation. However, 
steps can be made towards overcoming this problem by measuring the com- 
ponents of fitness under partially controlled situations (Grafen 1988). See 
Turke and Betzig (1985) for an example. 
In this same context, Tooby and Cosmides also suggest (p. 400) that 
adaptiveness can mean “high specific functionality in some particular be- 
havior or phenotypic expression (e.g., the eye achieves the special purpose 
of seeing well, whether or not in any specific instance that contributes to 
reproduction).” They intend here to divorce adaptiveness from reproductive 
success, but cannot do so completely because the function of any single 
adaptation is constrained by the functions of other adaptations. Thus, ulti- 
mately, what constitutes “well” in “seeing well” is not based on absolute 
criteria but on reproductive criteria. That is, the vision system we have is 
not the one that, out of the available alternatives, maximized vision, but the 
one that maximized fitness. Of course, as Symons notes (this volume), the 
fitness of designs-not of individuals-is what is ultimately of interest. The 
reason is that “only differences in outcomes which are due to differences 
in design can direct the evolution of adaptations” (Turke, this volume). 
Nevertheless, designs manifest their fitness through the actions of individ- 
uals, so individual reproduction is not of no interest as Symons implies (this 
volume, p. 428). 
Tooby and Cosmides on Adaptation 
Tooby and Cosmides state that “[IIndividual phenotypes are instances of 
designs, but not designs themselves” (this volume, p. 395). To illustrate, 
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they argue that in sequential hermaphrodites being male or female is not the 
adaptation, rather, the adaptation “is the conditional rule.” While I agree 
that conditional rules can be adaptations, such rules are always products of 
development, and as such are always phenotypic. In other words, both the 
design for an adaptation, and the instance of the adaptation are phenotypic. 
So even the development of conditional rules is contingent on environmental 
continuity. Genetic instructions, in contrast, are the nonphenotypic rules 
that underly design (Williams 1985), and genetic instructions accordingly are 
not adaptations. 
Moreover, as Tooby and Cosmides acknowledge, there are many ad- 
aptations that come between genetic instructions and the rule specifying 
hermaphroditism, and between this particular rule and the actual male or 
female outcome. Thus, adaptations unfold in a continuous process of de- 
velopment (Turke, this volume), and in the case of hermaphroditic fish even 
the process of being male or female (after the decision rule has been acti- 
vated) is comprised of many adaptations. 
In related discussion, Tooby and Cosmides suggest that polyandry, for 
example, cannot be an adaptation because to practice polyandry or not to 
practice polyandry is caused by environmental rather than genetic differ- 
ences (this volume, p. 395). I agree, the multitude of mechanisms (wet and 
behavioral) that underly the outcome (e.g., polyandry or monogamy) are the 
adaptations. 
However, there almost certainly is not a single switching rule that spec- 
ifies polyandry under some conditions and monogamy under others. It is 
plausible, though, to hypothesize that there are specific cost-benefit rules 
which, when integrated and applied to the social, sexual, and economic 
problems encountered in Tibet (and a few other places), generate polyan- 
drous outcomes (Betzig 1989; Alexander, this volume; Turke, this volume). 
In this sense, there may be adaptations for specifying a range of outcomes, 
and in some instances polyandry is the specified outcome. 
Tooby and Cosmides on Emotions 
As Tooby and Cosmides suggest (this volume), emotions are adaptations 
that can guide behavioral strategies to adapative outcomes. For example, 
as they note, feelings of grief are expected to be cued by occurrences which 
in the evolutionary past have had maladaptive consequences, and therefore 
grief can serve as an incentive to avoid such occurrences. As such, I would 
imagine that grief originated long before hominids. Homo sapiens sapiens’ 
grief, however, appears to be much more than a mechanism for avoiding 
events that were correlated with maladaptive outcomes. In fact, grief by H. 
s. s. may be less important as an incentive for avoiding certain kinds of 
events than it is as a mechanism for bringing together social support in times 
of crisis (e.g., grieving at funerals), and for making image-enhancing state- 
ments about the kind of caring, committed, loving person one is. In this 
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light, both conflicts of interest and the potential for manipulation are likely 
to be central to an understanding of human grief (cf. Alexander 1987, on 
guilt). If this argument is reasonable, human grief is much more than a guide- 
post for avoiding formerly maladaptive circumstances, and therefore it will 
be necessary to study grief as a component of complex, plastic, social re- 
productive strategies. In turn, understanding the current reproductive con- 
sequences of grief is likely to be important. 
Tooby and Cosmides on Timing 
Contrary to Tooby and Cosmides (this volume, p. 391), the most recent 500 
generations are likely to have shaped human evolution more than the 500 
that preceded them, given, as they claim, that the environment (i.e., selective 
pressures) has changed more in more recent times. For the same reason, 
the previous 2 million years are not likely to have been only 1/5th as im- 
portant to human evolution as the 10 million years which preceeded them. 
Hindsight 
I have argued, following many others (e.g., Betzig 1989; Alexander 1988; 
this volume), that understanding “why” informs “how.” and that under- 
standing “why” often requires understanding current reproductive conse- 
quences. Kitcher (1985) and Symons (1987) have suggested, however, that 
folk psychology offers a superior guide to the study of “how.” Symons also 
claims that because of his “evolution-mindedness” (e.g., 1989) few of the 
explanations of “why” offered by Alexander et al. have told him anything 
he didn’t already know. These kinds of claims, I think, are meant to down- 
play the importance of well designed, and in many cases well supported, 
evolutionary hypotheses about adapative significance (see also Alexander 
1988). 
But are folk psychology and evolution-mindedness adequate substitutes 
for careful evolutionary hypotheses and the data which test them? Consider 
the following examples. Barkow (this volume) accepts much of what de- 
mographers have concluded about old age security and high fertility, whereas 
I have rejected these conclusions (see above); yet we both are evolution- 
minded and familiar with folk psychological wisdom. Similarly, while some 
prominent evolutionists are also prominent Marxists, Symons claims that 
his evolution-mindedness leads him to expect that Marxist predictions are 
doomed to failure (e.g., Symons 1989). All of this raises the question of 
whether Symons’ lack of surprise (especially when it comes to Betzig’s 
findings) is due to evolution-mindedness, folk psychology, or hindsight. 
Symons’ Examples 
In the target article, the example of stepping out of the way of a fast moving 
truck was used to illustrate the existence of general purpose mechanisms. 
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Symons notes, and I agree, that “correlations between avoiding/not avoiding 
trucks and reproductive success” does not have much to offer anyone trying 
to understand the adaptations involved. However, neither I nor my asso- 
ciates have ever claimed that such correlations are always useful. We have 
argued that knowledge of evolutionary reproductive significance is useful, 
and is sometimes informed by current reproductive consequences, but in 
the case of avoiding heavy fast-moving objects like trucks evolutionary re- 
productive significance is not obscure. 
However, what if the behavior in question were much more obscure? 
What if many cultural anthropologists believed that the mysterious practice 
of truck avoidance was only superficially related to survival but deeply re- 
lated to some structural consideration concerning the fact that some foods 
are eaten raw while others are eaten cooked? What if advocates of Dawkins’ 
(1976) meme theory believed that the idea “truck avoidance” had a nice 
ring to it and spread through the population of ideas on that account? What 
if still others argued that truck avoidance evolved to serve the good of the 
group? In each case these hypotheses would be refuted or at least questioned 
by evidence demonstrating that this mysterious behavior correlates with 
fitness. Refuting these types of hypotheses has been important, both for 
clarifying our understanding of specific phenomena and for challenging non- 
adaptationist views of human nature (see Turke, this volume). Thus, much 
of this debate could have been avoided if BCST had recognized the specific 
goals that individuals such as Chagnon and Irons were trying to accomplish 
(e.g., Chagnon and Irons 1979). 
The foregoing is not to suggest, though, that an understanding of current 
fitness effects is important only in the refutation of a few odd hypotheses 
popular in the social science literature. On the contrary, fitness effects can 
illuminate adaptations in ways that even evolutionarily informed scholars 
should appreciate. For example, if Chagnon argued that the mysterious truck 
avoidance behavior was part of a mating strategy and Irons argued that it 
was part of a parental strategy, we could begin to test their hypotheses by 
determining the components of fitness most effected by truck avoidance. In 
turn, as a result of their research we would be in a better position to conduct 
even more detailed studies of the mechanisms involved. In short, the evo- 
lutionary adaptive significance of many of the phenomena of interest to 
anthropologists, biologists, and psychologists is much more obscure than it 
is for truck avoidance, and therefore such phenomena have been, or can be, 
illuminated by studies of current reproductive outcomes. 
In another example, Symons (this volume, p. 433) concludes that the 
amount of sugar, fat, and salt eaten by westerners is maladaptive. On the 
basis of good evidence indicating that these dietary factors contribute to 
many degenerative diseases, he is probably right. His point, though, again 
is that concluding that particular behaviors are maladaptive or adaptive does 
not inform our understanding of the adaptations comprising behaviors. Here 
I suggest his case against measuring fitness consequences is not as tight as 
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for truck avoidance. That is, even for this seemingly straightforward ex- 
ample-in which a current phenomenon appears to be fully explained by 
the malfunctioning of a few specific Pleistocene mechanisms-it neverthe- 
less might be useful to explore the reproductive consequences of a preference 
for fat, sweet, and salty foods. What if, for example, it turned out that after 
controlling for likely confounding factors we found that the level of fat, salt, 
and sugar consumption optimal for Darwinian fitness is significantly higher 
than the level optimal for physical fitness? I suggest that such a finding would 
stimulate and guide a good deal of new research on mechanisms. 
In regard to the points Symons (this volume) raises about the Yano- 
mamo, work by Chagnon since at least 1975 has sought to demonstrate that 
the cultural ideals (including fierceness) and corresponding cultural strate- 
gies of Yanomamo males are reproductive strategies. This work is seminal, 
hotly contested by mainstream anthropologists, clearly supported by Chag- 
non’s analyses of differential reproductive success (e.g., Chagnon 1988), and 
by design, helps to refute the argument that human nature is a nature con- 
ducive to independent cultural evolution. 
Symons’ statements about Chagnon’s data not indicating genetic dif- 
ferences, or differences in anatomy and physiology, between the Yanomamo 
and other people are irrelevant, and suggests that he misunderstands some 
of the arguments about phenotypic plasticity, learning, and general pur- 
poseness, to which he alludes. At the very least, Symons does not understand 
the nature of the arguments into which Chagnon has entered. 
Labels 
Labels can be useful, but they also can be abused. Sahlins crossed the line 
separating use from abuse by implying that some of “us” might be “vulgar 
sociobiologists” (Sahlins 1976). Similarly, Gould and Lewontin (1979) ap- 
plied the label “adaptationist program,” and thereby attempted to identify 
us as the group believing that every aspect of every phenotype is perfectly 
adapted to every circumstance. Kitcher calls us “pop sociobiologists” sup- 
posedly to distinguish us from the sociobiologists studying nonhumans- 
apparently “human sociobiologists” never occurred to him (Alexander 
1988). Now Symons would like us to be known as “DAs” (Darwinian an- 
thropologists), “DSSs” (Darwinian social scientists), or as belonging to the 
“adaptivist program” (Symons 1989; this volume); and Tooby and Cosmides 
favor the label “correspondence program” (this volume). 
Some of these labels are mildly offensive, and thus are obviously meant 
to cast doubt through ridicule. This ad hominem tactic has the advantage of 
being easier and less risky than directly challenging what is believed to be 
an opposing position. Symons and Tooby and Cosmides have been more 
subtle than Sahlins, Gould, Kitcher, and Lewontin, but nevertheless have 
crossed the line into abuse. 
In particular, their use of labels has been liberating. For example, see 
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Tooby and Cosmides’ anonymous, pseudoquotation describing the position 
of the correspondence program (this volume, p. 377). This is not an isolated 
incident; the publications of BCST are littered with the claim that DAs be- 
lieve that humans are infinitely flexible, infinitely general purpose, and ca- 
pable of adapting to every situation (e.g. Tooby and Cosmides, this volume, 
p. 403). 
Whereas it is difficult to attribute ridiculous arguments to Alexander, 
Chagnon, and Irons, the anonymous correspondence program says all man- 
ner of stupid things; any position can be attributed to the DA approach, 
because DA cannot defend herself (cf. Alexander 1988). It is too bad that 
much of the current debate can be traced to individuals using such contriv- 
ances to claim a superior position, when in fact we are all very much in the 
same position. 
CONCLUSION 
Questions of originality aside, I agree in general with the approach advocated 
by BCST, even while disagreeing with many of the specific hypotheses they 
have derived. Because motives and associated behaviors are often veiled 
and mysterious (probably by design, in hypersocial species such as our own 
[Trivers 1985; Alexander 1987]), understanding the evolutionary adaptive 
significance of traits is a crucial but difficult task. BCST recognize that 
understanding evolutionary adaptive significance is crucial but they seem 
not to appreciate the difficulties involved. That is, they ignore (in fact de- 
plore) tests which potentially bear on their assumptions about past selection 
pressures, and in their place rely on assertions about what must have been 
adaptive during the Pleistocene. In part, this stems from their failure to 
acknowledge the extreme flexibility and capacity for deception and self- 
deception that so obviously characterizes humans. 
Anyway, at long last BCST have begun to acknowledge that under- 
standing current reproductive consequences can help us in the extremely 
important and difficult task of understanding the evolutionary adaptive sig- 
nificance of adaptations. With so much agreement in the air, it is time to 
get on with the task of generating and testing specific hypotheses about 
human nature, and about the phenomena that result from that nature. So to 
BCST: just do it. 
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